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ABSTRACT 
 
In this essay, I will try to analyze the problems of assisted suicide and euthanasia by using the Joel 
Feinberg’s analysis of the so-called ‘right to life’ and the Wesley Hohfeld’s legal terminology. 
Through Feinberg’s analysis I will trace a conceptual and normative distinction between assisted 
suicide and euthanasia; through the Wesley Hohfeld’s legal terminology I will develop this 
distinction to show where the distinction precisely arises. My conclusion will be that the problem of 
permissibility of assisted suicide is conceptually and normatively different from the problem of 
permissibility of euthanasia. 
 
 
In bioethics it is quite usual to consider assisted suicide and euthanasia as connected 
issues and think that permissibility for the former imply permissibility for (or a prima 
facie presumption in favour of) the latter. I think this view is incorrect. I believe that 
there is an important conceptual difference that marks an important normative 
difference. In this paper I will try to show what is this difference and where the 
distinction between assisted suicide and euthanasia arises. An implication of my 
argument is that a justification (or a refusal) of the former does not imply a justification 
(or a refusal) of the latter; that is, the problem of permissibility of assisted suicide is 
conceptually and normatively different from the problem of permissibility of euthanasia. 
I will proceed as follows. In section 1, I will try to frame these problems (assisted suicide 
and euthanasia) by offering some preliminary definitions and delimiting their area of 
application. In section 2 I will use the Joel Feinberg’s analysis of the so-called ‘right to 
life’. Feinberg’s analysis provides us the elements required to trace a conceptual and 
normative distinction between assisted suicide and euthanasia. I will develop this 
distinction in a more detailed way in section 4, using Wesley Hohfeld’s legal terminology 
(which I will present in section 3). My idea is that the application of the Hohfeldian 
scheme to Feinberg’s concept of right to life enables us to find the distinctive feature 
between assisted suicide and euthanasia, and this allow us to set up the issues involved 
in these practices in a particular way. 
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 1. Preliminary definitions 
 
In this section I will start with some preliminary definitions, that will be modified later in 
this paper. At a very general level, we say that assisted suicide is the act through which a 
person takes his/her life through means furnished by another person (whereas the 
suicide tout court is the act of killing oneself without others’ help). The classic example is 
someone who swallows a lethal pill another person has provided him with. The provider 
is not necessarily a physician (for example, he/she could be a relative). Therefore 
assisted suicide is a wider concept than physician-assisted suicide; however, in this 
paper I will ignore the difference and I will use assisted suicide, without any other 
specifications, to refer to physician-assisted suicide. Again, at a very general level, we 
say that euthanasia is the act of killing someone for his good. In this case, the classic 
example is someone, typically a physician, who gives a lethal injection to another person 
(from now on, I will also consider euthanasia as a problem located in the 
physician/patient therapeutic relation).  
There are at least three possible cases of euthanasia: voluntary euthanasia, when the 
lethal injection is given according to the patient’s genuine, explicit, constant and well-
considered request; non-voluntary euthanasia, when the lethal injection is given without 
the patient’s consent (because he is not able to express it; for example, when he is in 
permanent vegetative state); involuntary euthanasia, when the lethal injection is made 
against the patient’s will. It is worth noting that considerations about the patient’s good 
determine the conceptual difference between euthanasia and murder: although both acts 
cause the patient’s death, euthanasia is made for the patient’s good, whereas murder is 
made without any consideration of it. In order to complete the picture, we finally say 
that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is the act of letting the patient die by stopping 
a particular medical treatment. An example of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is 
the interruption of a pharmacological therapy that allows the disease to go on and, 
therefore, lead the patient to death more quickly. Another example is the interruption of 
hydration and feeding in permanent vegetative state patients, who will consequently die 
of starvation. 
Therefore, at a conceptual level, we have five possible situations connected with dying 
(suicide, assisted suicide, withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, euthanasia, murder); 
and one of them (euthanasia), as we have seen, can be voluntary, involuntary and not-
voluntary. Let us omit murder, which does not regard directly the topic of this paper and 
focus on the other four situations. Before proceeding, it is however useful to point out 
two specifications (I will refer to the case of euthanasia, but the same can also be said 
for suicide – assisted or not –, and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment). First 
specification: it is necessary to keep in mind that the legal issue (i.e., if the legal system 
foresees or should foresee, and under which conditions, euthanasia) and the moral issue 
(i.e., whether there could be or not a moral justification for euthanasia, whatever the 
legal system provides) are two distinct issues. This specification, very obvious indeed, is 
useful when we consider that in several countries, judges have been often pronunciate 
sentences about the permissibility of euthanasia and related practices. Their sentences 
on specific cases and in specific contexts have circulated in the bioethical debate and 
 2
 this has in fact contributed to mix moral reasoning and legal reasoning, whereas the 
limits of what is morally permissible are clearly different from the limits of what is legally 
permissible. Second specification: assuming that the moral permissibility of euthanasia, 
if any, should be translated (according to appropriate procedures) into a legally 
recognized permissibility, it is necessary to consider four different ways in which this 
translation could be made. First, we could consider euthanasia as a crime but at the 
same time encourage judges not to prosecute it; or, we could consider euthanasia as a 
crime but admit that it is not punishable in some circumstances (for example, when 
euthanasia concerns seriously suffering and terminally ill patients); still, we could 
maintain the crime but make extenuating some reasons and/or circumstances (for 
example, serious suffering and terminal illness); finally, we could, abolish the crime and 
legalize euthanasia, perhaps (and favourably) conditioning the way of its application . 
In this paper, I am not interested, if not incidentally, in the legal aspects of the problem, 
nor I will inquire what is the more correct way to translate moral permissibility into legal 
permissibility. I will focus my attention on moral permissibility, without considering its 
actual or potential legal implementation. 
 
 
2. Suicide, euthanasia and right to life 
 
In order to discuss the issue on euthanasia I think it is useful to analyze what Joel 
Feinberg has said about the so-called ‘right to life’.(1) Feinberg shows that the complex 
and controversial concept of ‘right to life’ involves at least two ideas: first, people have a 
right not to be killed (call this D1); second, people have a right to be rescued from 
impending death (call this D2). If we summarize our preliminary definitions, we can see 
that euthanasia, withdrawing life-sustaining treatment and assisted suicide violate 
(D1+D2): more specifically, euthanasia violates D1, withdrawing life-sustaining treatment 
and the assisted suicide violate D2. However, the issue is a little more complex. 
Intuitively, it seems to me implausible to think that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment 
or attending the suicide of a terminally ill patient can be easily put on the same side, for 
example, of refusing to throw a life belt to a person who is drowning; in fact, the 
violation of D2 seems morally important only in the latter case, whereas it seems 
implausible this violation will morally interest us in the case of withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment or attendance to a suicide of a terminally ill patient (arguments 
against these practices are others than the violation of the right to life). Therefore, it can 
be assumed that the right of being rescued from impending death is to be better 
specified, as a right to be rescued from starting an irreversible process of death (call this 
right D3), and therefore the interpretation of the right to life must be corrected as 
(D1+D3). Withdrawing life-sustaining treatment and attending the suicide of a terminally 
ill patient clearly do not violate D3, because the irreversible process of death is not 
started (although it is accelerated) by withdrawing or attendance; and given that 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment and attending the suicide do not violat D1, we can 
assert that both are coherent with (D1+D3). 
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 In what follows I would like to examine the implications that the idea of a right to life 
may have for the issues of assisted suicide and euthanasia (hereafter I will consider only 
D1, assuming that there are no conflicts between D1 and D3, or, if there are, they can be 
solved). In order to do this, we have to go back to Feinberg and his argument of the 
alienability of the right to life. According to Feinberg we usually think that a right is 
alienable if the holder can (not in an empirical but in a normative sense) resign it; if not, 
we characterize the right as an inalienable right.(2) The interesting point is that it is not 
always clear, when people discuss about euthanasia or assisted suicide, if the alienability 
(or the inalienability) in question concerns life or the right to life.(3) These are two 
different questions: if life is alienable, I am allowed to kill myself, but other people are 
not allowed to do it; if the right to life is alienable (under particular circumstances), 
others are allowed (if the particular circumstances occur and I alienate the right 
effectively and correctly) to kill me. In the same way, if life is not alienable, I am not 
allowed to kill myself; if the right to life is not alienable, others are not allowed to kill 
me. 
From these considerations we can begin to see the feature that generates conceptual 
discontinuity between assisted suicide and euthanasia: if the alienability of the right to 
life is a different issue from the alienability of life, then euthanasia must be distinguished 
from suicide, being the former a matter of alienability of the right to life, and the latter a 
matter of the alienability of life. However, to completely identify this feature we have to 
address Wesley Hohfeld’s analysis on legal concepts and consider the issues of the 
alienability of life and the alienability of the right to life using his terminology.(4) 
 
 
3. Hohfeld and fundamental legal concepts 
 
According to Wesley Hohfeld, for a proper representation of the legal space, it is enough 
to use eight concepts: right (or claim), privilege (or liberty), power, immunity, duty, no-
right, liability,(5) inability. Among these concepts there are relations of correlation 
(which reproduce the legal relation between two subjects)(6) and opposition (which are 
merely semantic). The following table shows these relationships. 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Types Claim-Right Privilege (liberty) Power Immunity 
Correlatives Duty No-right Liability Disability 
Opposites No-right Duty Disability Liability 
 
According to Hohfeld, the concepts inserted into the row ‘types’ express, four different 
types of legal advantage that are usually summarised under the generic expression right; 
using them in an appropriate way (i.e., respecting the logical relations of correlation and 
opposition existing among them), we can achieve an analytical purification that, 
according to Hohfeld, will allow us to avoid terminological confusions in the realm of 
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 legal language. In what follows we will analyse these concepts and their respective 
relations of correlation and opposition (numbers correspond to the columns of the table). 
 
1) Rights in the strict sense are claims against other people concerning some actions or 
some states of affairs. Having a claim-right means that others have a correlative duty. So, 
 
If Adam has a claim-right that Barbara do x, Barbara has a duty to make x. 
Example: if Adam has a claim-right to have money from Barbara, Barbara has a 
duty to give money to him. 
 
If Adam has a claim-right to x, any other people have a correlative duty towards Adam 
on x.  
Example: if Adam has a claim-right not to be killed, any other people have the 
duty not to kill Barbara. 
 
Hohfeld defines no-right the absence of a claim-right: therefore no-right is, the opposite 
of a claim-right. In this category, we can distinguish positive rights (which impose 
positive actions upon the other party, as, for example, the right of citizens to be 
protected from violence by the State) and negative rights (which demand only non-
interference, as the right not to be assaulted), or rights in personam (which are held 
against a specific person or group), and rights in rem (which are held against people at 
large). 
 
2) Privileges are liberties. If I have a liberty-right, I have no constraint set up by other 
people's rights. So,  
 
If Barbara has a liberty-right towards Adam not to do x, Adam has a no-right that 
Barbara does x. 
Example: if Barbara has a liberty-right not to give money to Adam, Adam does 
not have any right to have money from her. 
 
If Barbara has a liberty-right to do x, any other people do not have any right that 
Barbara does not do x. 
Example: if Barbara has a liberty to kill any other people, none has any right that 
Barbara does not kill them. 
 
However, as we have seen at 1, if there is a claim-right, Barbara has a duty to give 
money to Adam and has a duty not to kill anybody. Moreover, as the table above shows, 
the opposite of a claim-right is a no-right and the opposite of a liberty-right is a duty. So, 
it is not true that liberty-rights require correlative duties: if I have a liberty-right to do 
something, it does not follow that other people have a duty not to prevent me from doing 
it. Duty is the opposite of liberty, not its correlative (which is no-right). Therefore, if a 
soccer player has the liberty to score a goal, it does not follow that the players of the 
opponent team have a duty to allow him to do it; rather, they have an analogous liberty 
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 to prevent him from scoring, respecting the rules of the game (not, for example, tripping 
up).(7) 
Confusion arises because people usually hold liberty-rights within a context of claim-
rights; the latter, as Hart famously said, constitute the “protective perimeter” of the 
formers (this is the reason why Hart speaks of vested liberties).(8) Therefore, in the 
example above, the liberty of the player to score a goal is protected by a perimeter of 
claim-rights that prohibits other people to prevent him in not prescribed ways to score. 
This coexistence of claim-rights and liberty-rights is not necessary from a pure logical 
point of view, because we can imagine situations where there are liberties without any 
protection provided by claim-rights (in this case Hart speaks of naked liberties).(9) Take, 
for example, the Hobbesian state of nature: all liberties are naked, because no duty to 
others exists (neither, obviously, some correlative claim-right), and people have the 
liberty to do all what they judge useful for the preservation of their life, and resources 
(and others’ bodies too) belong to those that can get them, and for so long as they can 
keep them.(10) The conceptual separation between liberty-rights and claim-rights can be 
illustrated more clearly by making reference to freedom of expression: it is a liberty-right 
insofar as it attributes the liberty to express his or her ideas to his/her holder; it is, 
instead, a claim-right insofar as it states what others have the duty to do or not to do 
towards him or her (for example, not to gag him or her, not to do noise while he or she 
speaks, to allow him or her to have access to the media etc). As Jones says, we can 
affirm that “from the perspective of the right-holder, liberty-rights are ‘active’ in that 
they concern what the right-holder is himself entitled to do or not to do, [... ] claim-rights 
are ‘passive’ in that they concern what others are obliged to do or not to do in respect of 
the right-holder”.(11) 
 
3) Power is the legal ability to change a legal relation. From this point of view, 
 
If Adam has a power to force Barbara to change from legal relation r1 to legal 
relation r2, Barbara is subjected to that change. 
Example: if Adam has a power to exempt Barbara from the duty to give him 
money, Barbara is subjected to this power of exemption held by Adam  if Adam 
exercises it, Barbara has no duty to give money to Adam anymore, and Adam has 
no claim-right to Barbara’s money anymore. 
 
If Adam has a power to force any other people to change from legal relation r1 to 
legal relation r2 concerning x, everyone are subjected to this change to r2 
concerning x. 
Example: if Adam has the power to extinguish his right not to be killed, any other 
people are subjected to this extinction  if Adam exercises it, he has no claim-
right not to be killed anymore and any other people have no correlative duty not 
to kill him anymore. 
 
In the Hohfeldian scheme, therefore liability is correlative of power. Lack of power 
constitutes disability, which is opposite of power. 
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4) Immunity is not being subjected to another’s power to change a legal relation. So, 
 
If Barbara has an immunity concerning the Adam’s power to change from legal 
relation r1 to legal relation r2, Adam has the disability to change from r1 to r2. 
Example: if Barbara has an immunity from Adam concerning her claim-right of 
having money, Adam does not have the power to deprive Barbara of this right  
Barbara continues to have the right to receive money and Adam the duty to give 
money to her. 
 
If Barbara has an immunity concerning legal relation r1, any other people do not 
have the power to oblige Barbara to change to r2. 
Example: if Barbara has an immunity about the extinction of the claim-right not to 
be killed, any other people have the power to extinguish it  Barbara continues to 
have the right not to be killed and any other people their correlative duties. 
 
Therefore the correlative of immunity is disability. On the contrary, if Adam has this 
ability, then Barbara is subjected to Adam’s power; therefore, being subjected to 
someone is the opposite of immunity. Examples of immunity-rights are civil rights 
(freedom of expression, press, religion etc.) normally protected in liberal democracies 
from the interference of political power. However, we have to distinguish between 
immunity-rights and liberty-rights: having an immunity regarding x means that other 
people have no power over x, while having a liberty-right on x means that other people 
cannot advance any claim on x.(12) 
 
Hohfeld’s classification would deserve many considerations, but only two are interesting 
for us.(13) First, it should be clear that the Hohfeldian scheme is purely formal, so it 
works independently from the content of the single concepts constituting it, that is to say 
it works independently from what particular claims, liberties, powers, immunities, duties, 
no-rights, liabilities and disabilities are recognised by a legal system. Let us consider, for 
example, claim-rights: someone might believe that only civil and political rights are 
rights in a proper sense, while another might believe that “social rights” ahould be 
included in this category (the right to a job, to a pension, to free health care); and some 
other people think that group rights (right of self determination, for example) should be 
recognized. The Hohfeldian scheme is indifferent about these issues: in fact, it limits 
itself to assume that the acknowledgment of a right implies the imposition of a correlative 
duty, but it does not say anything about the problem of establishing whether such a right 
is morally justified. From Hohfeld we can gather, for example, that Andrew has the duty 
to give a job to Barbara if she has the right to have a job from Andrew, but we cannot 
deduce anything about the moral foundation  of her right. 
Secondly, it is virtually possible to extend (and it is, indeed, what I am doing in this 
paper) the Hohfeldian concepts from the legal to the moral sphere, insofar as these 
concepts would not simply serve to describe a series of actual legal relations, but, rather, 
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 they would define the moral permissibility of the actions of individuals and the 
constraints posed on them by other individuals or the State.(14) 
 
 
4. Assisted suicide and euthanasia: a conceptual distinction 
 
Let us go back to the concept of the right to life and Feinberg’s distinction between the 
renunciation of life and the renunciation of the right to life, and restate all this in the 
Hohfeldian terminology. To affirm that I have a right to life, i.e. I have a right not to be 
killed, is equivalent, by correlation, to affirm that other people have a duty not to kill me 
(that is, by opposition, they do not have the liberty to kill me). If my right to life is 
alienable, then I have the power to modify the relation that exists between me and other 
people, i.e. I have the power to resign my right not to be killed. In that case, if I exercise 
my power, other people, by correlation, are subject to my renunciation; moreover, I do 
not have the right not to be killed anymore and other people, again by correlation, do 
not have the duty not to kill me (that is, by opposition, they have the freedom to kill me). 
Vice versa, if my right to life is not alienable, I do not have the power to resign my right 
not to be killed: therefore, I still have my right not to be killed and other people, by 
correlation, have the duty not to kill me (that is, by opposition, they still do not have the 
liberty to kill me). Voluntary euthanasia is a case of renunciation of the right to life 
(indeed, I resign the right not to be killed), so it is permitted in circumstances in which 
this renunciation is allowed. 
The case of renunciation of life is different. If my life is alienable, I have the liberty to 
renounce life, but I do not have the power to resign the right not to be killed; and other 
people, by correlation, do not have rights against my renunciation of life, even if they 
still have the duty not to kill me (that is, by opposition, they do not have the liberty to 
kill me). Vice versa, if my life is not alienable, then I do not have the liberty to renounce 
life, but, by opposition, I have the duty not to do it. (Assisted) suicide is a case of 
renunciation of life (I do not resign the right not to be killed), so it is allowed in 
circumstances in which this renunciation is permitted. 
At this point we can modify the preliminary definitions from which we started. Notice 
that we do this not because those definitions were wrong, but only because they did not 
identify the difference between assisted suicide and euthanasia that is instead essential 
for our aim. From the list of modified definitions that I am going to provide, the 
following difference would emerge. 
 
1. Suicide = renunciation of life made without anybody’s help. 
2. Withdrawing life-sustaining treatment = renunciation of life made though 
renouncing some specific medical treatment.(15) 
3. (Physician-)assisted suicide = renunciation of life made with somebody’s help. 
4. Euthanasia 
4.1     Voluntary = renunciation of the right to life. 
4.2     Non-voluntary = violation of the right to life in the interest of the victim, who is in 
the condition neither for renouncing it nor for not renouncing it. 
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 4.3 Involuntary = violation of the right to life in the interest of the victim, who does 
not want to renounce it. 
5.       Murder = violation of the right to life against, or without considering, the interest 
of the victim. 
 
The important difference existing between cases 1-3 on one hand and 4-5 on the other 
one is the following: cases 1-3 concern the liberty to renounce life, whereas cases 4-5 
concern the power to renounce the right to life. Note that this is a conceptual difference 
and not a moral difference, although, as I will try to prove, this conceptual difference is 
important for the elaboration of a moral argument. 
We omit 4.2, 4.3 and 5 (all they deal with the violation of the right to life), and we focus 
on cases 1-3 from one part and 4.1 from the other. At least two points are made clear 
by the conceptual difference above. First, suicide, withdrawing life-sustaining treatment 
and assisted suicide are on the same side of the dividing line that we traced; therefore, 
the possible permissibility of one of these, at least prima facie, would involve the 
permissibility of the other two. From this point of view, admitting the permissibility of 
suicide (without any other argument) implies to admit also the permissibility of assisted 
suicide. Second, assisted suicide and euthanasia are not on the same side of the line; 
therefore the possible permissibility of one of them does not have consequences for the 
permissibility of the other. Admitting the permissibility of assisted suicide does not force 
us to admit the permissibility of voluntary euthanasia as a logical consequence; then, you 
can argue that voluntary euthanasia should be permitted only using a different argument 
from that you would have possibly used in order to admit the permissibility of assisted 
suicide.(16) The same applies to withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. 
People thinking euthanasia should be permitted and recognized by law will find this a 
discouraging outcome. To put euthanasia on the same side of suicide seems to confer 
normative force to euthanasia, since we usually think that nothing is morally wrong in 
suicide itself (although there are certain situations in which it should be considered 
morally wrong, for example if we have an obligation or responsibility for someone); it is 
not without reason, it seems to me, that we usually reserve mercy, not blame, to the 
suicides. From this point of view, then, separating suicide and euthanasia seems to be, 
at best, a way for ‘saving’ assisted suicide and renouncing the fight for the more difficult 
battle in favour of euthanasia. But it could also introduce an argument to distinguish 
between suicide tout court and assisted suicide, excluding therefore also assisted suicide 
from the list of legitimate practices after having previously discarded euthanasia. For 
example, it could be objected that suicide is lawful, but the attendance to suicide is not. 
Therefore, when the physician supplies the patient with the lethal pill, it could be 
asserted that the patient is allowed to take the pill, but that the physician is not allowed 
to give it to him. 
I do not want to insist on this point, but I think it is possible here to suggest a couple of 
shortcomings. In the first place, it is not clear why, if suicide is not morally wrong (at 
least under some specific conditions), to help someone to do it (at least under some 
specific conditions) should be morally wrong. Second, the physician participating in the 
killing plan is not the causal factor of the patient’s death, but he/she is only part of the 
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 causal process that brings about the patient’s renunciation of life, like the producer of 
the lethal pill or the supplier that brought it into the hospital (if nobody had produced 
the pill or had transported it into the hospital, the patient’s renunciation of life would not 
have been possible, at least with these modalities). 
Obviously, this does not exhaust the argument in favour of assisted suicide; I do not 
deny, of course, that other arguments are available to people who want to contrast this 
practice.(17) However, my aim here was to focus on the separation between the issue of 
assisted suicide and the issue of euthanasia. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper I have tried to show that there is an important conceptual difference 
between assisted suicide and euthanasia. This means that the justification (or the refusal) 
of the former does not imply the justification (or the refusal) of the latter. From this point 
of view, therefore, the problem of the permissibility of assisted suicide is a different 
conceptual and normative problem from the one of the permissibility of euthanasia. In 
this paper I was not arguing for or against assisted suicide and euthanasia. Rather I was 
trying to offer a possible (and, I hope, original) guideline useful to explore a very 
controversial topic. 
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